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Abstract: 
This paper compares the distributional effects of conventional monetary policy and quantitative 
easing (QE) within an estimated open-economy DSGE model of the euro area. The model includes 
two groups of households: (i) wealthier households, who own financial assets and are able to 
smooth consumption over time, and (ii) poorer households, who only receive labor and transfer 
income and live ‘hand to mouth’. We use the model to compare the impact of policy shocks on 
constructed measures of income and wealth inequality (net disposable income, net asset position, 
and relative per-capita income). Except for the short term, expansionary conventional policy and 
QE shocks tend to mitigate income and wealth inequality between the two population groups. In 
light of the coarse dichotomy of households that abstracts from richer income and wealth dynamics 
at the individual level, the analysis emphasizes the functional distribution of income. 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of (risen awareness of) persistent, or even increasing, income and wealth inequality, 
distributional effects of economic policy occupy a prominent place in policy discussions these days. 
This is true particularly for structural policies and for fiscal measures, which often have an explicit 
redistributive aspect. In the context and aftermath of the financial crisis, however, the distributional 
implications of monetary policy have likewise received more attention.  
The distributional effects of monetary policy have received particular attention in the context of 
large-scale asset purchases (‘quantitative easing’). Especially the link between quantitative easing 
(QE) and asset prices has nurtured the view that QE has predominantly benefitted wealthy asset 
owners. A more thorough analysis should however also include other effects of QE, notably its 
stabilising impact on economic activity, employment, and wage incomes, which remains a central 
motivation behind the policy.  
In this paper, we compare the distributional effects of two monetary policy regimes in a general 
equilibrium framework: (i) conventional monetary policy, where the central bank follows a Taylor 
rule to set short-term nominal interest rates, and (ii) QE, where the central bank expands its balance 
sheet by purchasing long-term government bonds from the private sector. Our analysis builds on 
the estimated DSGE model of Hohberger et al. (2018), which introduces elements to study the 
macroeconomic implications of the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing policies. The 
model distinguishes between two types of households: (i) households that hold assets (government 
bonds, firm equity, and foreign bonds) and receive related income in addition to wages and 
transfers, and (ii) households that only receive wage and transfer income. Households (i) can 
smooth disposable income and consumption over time through financial markets, i.e. they do not 
face binding liquidity constraints (therefore, they are labelled NLC). Households (ii) live hand-to-
mouth, i.e. they face binding liquidity constraints (therefore, they are labelled LC). Given the 
additional source of income from financial assets (bonds and equity), NLC households are 
wealthier than LC households. 
We compare distributional effects of the two forms of monetary policy between the two household 
groups embedded in the model and study the impulse responses for a number of constructed 
distributional measures: the net disposable income, the net asset positions (financial wealth), and 
the per-capita net disposable income relative to the population average. Given the model's focus 
on asset owners versus households without financial assets, the analysis concentrates on the impact 
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of monetary policy on different functional income groups (labor income versus asset returns), 
rather than providing a more disaggregated perspective on heterogeneity in portfolio holding and 
associated portfolio valuation and investment income effects within the group of NLC households.  
The analysis is conducted using a two-region DSGE model for the euro area (EA) and the rest of 
the world (RoW), estimated with Bayesian techniques. Our model belongs to the class of two-agent 
New Keynesian (TANK) models, which can be thought of as a tractable middle ground between 
the (one) representative-agent New Keynesian framework and the heterogeneous-agent New 
Keynesian (HANK) model of, e.g., Kaplan et al. (2017). Our setup makes two simplifying 
assumptions compared to HANK models. First, the population shares of the two household types 
are constant, i.e. invariant to shocks. Second, we abstract from idiosyncratic income risk, which 
eliminates precautionary saving motives. Recent work by Debortoli and Galí (2018) shows that, 
despite these differences, the aggregate transmission of a monetary policy shock in TANK models 
is similar to that in a comparable HANK setup. 
The focus of this paper is on the relative position of two groups of households. Arguably, the LC 
household with labor and transfer income only approximates the income dynamics for the poorer 
part of the population, whereas intertemporally optimizing bond and equity holders (NLC) 
represent the wealthier share of the population. Focusing on only two household aggregates, rather 
than a more detailed income distribution is a price to pay at present for having a model that is richer 
in other dimensions and feedback mechanisms, such as a larger set of asset types (bonds of different 
maturities, foreign bonds, and corporate equity) and economic openness, and estimated. 
We model QE by incorporating a central bank balance sheet and by distinguishing between short-
term and long-term government debt. We use a formulation of private-sector portfolio composition 
as in Andrés et al. (2004), and Priftis and Vogel (2016), which breaks neutrality of central bank 
balance sheet policies, notably a change in the maturity structure, by introducing imperfect 
substitutability between assets of different maturity. The approach is similar to the ‘preferred 
habitat’ investor framework of Vayanos and Vila (2009) who provide a theoretical model for a 
duration risk channel of QE. The ‘preferred habitat’ model incorporates two agents: one has 
preferences for assets of a particular maturity, generating a downward sloping demand curve for 
that asset; the second agent is an arbitrageur, investing in all assets. In equilibrium, changes in the 
supply of an asset of particular maturity affect the price of that asset, and, by arbitrage, also the 
prices of other assets. QE can reduce the duration risk in the hands of investors and alter the yield 
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curve. Neely (2015) shows that a portfolio choice model can reproduce observed changes in US 
and foreign bond yields and the USD exchange rate in the context of US QE. Greenwood and 
Vayanos (2014) examine empirically how the supply and maturity structure of government debt 
can affect bond yields and expected returns. When controlling for the short-term rate, they find that 
the maturity-weighted debt-to-GDP ratio is positively associated with bond yields and future 
returns.  
In our framework of modelling QE, the central bank expands its balance sheet by purchasing long-
term bonds, the latter modelled as in Woodford (2001), and injecting liquidity to the private sector. 
Our specification allows us to capture effects of QE through a large number of transmission 
channels put forward by the literature, e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), including 
the saving, financing cost, exchange rate, inflation, and fiscal channels. Lutz (2015) adds an 
investor sentiment channel, i.e. conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks affecting 
investor sentiment or confidence. This channel is present in our model (only) as far as expansionary 
monetary policy is likely to improve the economic outlook, which in turn affects investment 
decisions by forward-looking agents.  
The analysis in this paper suggests that, similar to conventional short-term interest rate cuts, 
expansionary QE measures do not increase income and wealth inequality between population 
groups in our two-household model persistently. Conventional policy and QE policy shocks have 
a similar impact on real GDP, inflation, employment and the real exchange rate. In both cases, the 
wage share falls on impact, as wage stickiness raises firm profits, before it returns to baseline and 
positive territory in the medium term. The net income share of LC households falls on impact, due 
to the decline in the wage share and the increase in firm profits. In the medium term, when wages 
catch up, the income share of the LC households, i.e. the poorer part of the population, increases 
to above baseline. The income share of NLC households, as a mirror image, declines in response 
to expansionary monetary shocks in our model. The decline is more pronounced and more 
persistent for the QE shock, which follows from the reduction in private sector long-term bond 
holdings and associated returns. Looking at relative per-capita disposable income also indicates a 
(moderate) decline in income inequality in response to expansionary policy shocks.  
The net asset position of NLC households at market value increases on impact in our two scenarios, 
as lower interest rates are associated with an increase in the value of bonds (valuation effects). In 
the medium term, QE reduces the net asset position of the NLC households. The wealth 
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decumulation relative to the no-policy baseline follows from the decline in the NLC households' 
holding of interest-bearing long-term bonds and the reduction in private sector savings for a 
protracted period.  
The remainder of the paper presents a short literature review in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the 
elements of the model specific to the analysis of quantitative easing and the distributional effects 
of monetary policy. Section 4 describes the model solution and estimation methodology. Section 5 
discusses the impact of conventional and QE shocks on the economy and their distributional 
effects. Section 6 summarizes the paper and concludes. 
 
2. Related literature on the distributional effects of monetary policy 
Economic research has investigated the effect of monetary policy on aggregate economic 
variables, including total output, employment, and inflation, widely for many decades. In contrast, 
the theoretical and empirical literature investigating the distributional effects of monetary policy is 
relatively new. 
The existing literature discusses a number of channels that can generate distributional effects of 
monetary policy and, as a natural extension, of QE. Coibion et al. (2017) summarize these channels. 
The income composition channel is a first channel affecting the income distribution following 
monetary policy shocks. This derives from changes in the primary sources of income (e.g., 
business, financial and labor income, and transfers), which is heterogeneous across households. If 
expansionary policy, be it a reduction in the short-term interest rate, or purchases of long-term 
government bonds by the central bank, affects profits, asset returns, wages, or benefits and transfers 
asymmetrically, different household types will be affected to varying degrees. 
A second channel discussed by Coibion et al. (2017) is financial segmentation in the sense that 
financially more connected traders in financial markets will react faster to changes in monetary 
policy than the less-connected agents and will therefore benefit at the expense of the latter. This 
channel refers to distributional effects within the group of financial investors. 
The third channel listed in Coibion et al. (2017) is the portfolio channel. Households with 
disproportionately large net asset positions may gain from expansionary (conventional or 
unconventional) monetary policy through valuation gains. They may also lose, however, if their 
assets are not protected against inflation, as in the case of currency. If expansionary policy raises 
inflation, it erodes the real value of assets with fixed nominal value.  
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The fourth channel in the list is labelled savings redistribution channel and captures the fact that 
unanticipated expansionary monetary policy, creating surprise inflation, will hurt creditors (savers) 
and benefit debtors (borrowers) if debt is determined in nominal terms. If creditors and debtors 
belong to different parts of the wealth distribution, wealth inequality may decline. 
Finally, Coibion et al. (2017) mention the earnings heterogeneity channel. This channel relates to 
differences in income and unemployment risks across different segments of the labor market. When 
labor income risk in a recession is stronger in the lower part of the wage distribution, as documented 
by Heathcote et al. (2010), stabilization policy helps reducing pro-cyclical income dispersion. 
Colciago et al. (2018) survey empirical studies on the distributional effects of monetary policy. 
The empirical research on the effect of conventional monetary policy on income and wealth 
inequality gives mixed results. Furceri et al. (2018) in a recent study find expansionary 
(contractionary) conventional policy shocks to reduce (increase) income inequality in a panel of 32 
countries. Coibion et al. (2017) study US monetary policy and find analogously that contractionary 
monetary policy increases labor and total income inequality. Domanski et al. (2016) use 
simulations of household finance surveys from five European countries and the US to find that 
changes in wealth inequality since 2009 have been driven by movements in equity valuations and 
house prices. As real estate is relatively more important at the lower end of the wealth distribution, 
house price increases alone tend to reduce inequality, whereas increases in equity price, possibly 
in response to a monetary expansion, tend to increase wealth inequality. Similarly, O’Farrell and 
Rawdanowicz (2017) stress the uneven distribution of asset classes across the wealth distribution, 
so that distributional effects depend on which types of asset prices change most. Adam and 
Tzamourani (2016) use the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) to show that the 
effect of asset price inflation on inequality in euro area countries varies across assets. In particular, 
changes in bond prices do not have significant effects on inequality, changes in equity prices 
increase wealth inequality, and changes in house prices reduce inequality. 
The empirical analysis of distributional effects of unconventional monetary policies, such as QE, 
faces the difficulty that non-standard policies have been in place for much shorter time, so that time 
series for longer periods and larger country samples are not readily available at this point. Based 
on the various transmission channels, Colciago et al. (2018) observe that unconventional monetary 
policies may reduce income inequality by stimulating economic activity, but may also increase 
inequality by boosting asset prices. Montecino and Epstein (2015) use data from the Federal 
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Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances and find that recent expansionary unconventional 
monetary policy in the US contributed to rising inequality, driven in particular by an increase in 
the value of corporate equities. In line with the earnings heterogeneity channel, the increase in 
employment amongst the least wealthy had a redistributive role, but was dampened by falling real 
wages and difficulties in mortgage refinancing of credit-constrained households. Using detailed 
micro-level data, Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017) arrive at similar results for the Bank of 
England’s QE measures. Saiki and Frost (2014) estimate a VAR with household survey data and 
find that the expansionary non-standard monetary policy in Japan has widened income inequality 
in the late 2000s, due largely to the portfolio channel. Focusing on the euro area, Guerello (2018) 
estimates a panel VAR with monetary policy indicators and measures of income inequality. Her 
results suggest high cross-country heterogeneity in the impact of monetary policy and interactions 
with the redistributive strength of fiscal policy and the maturity of the household portfolio. She 
finds that unconventional monetary policy tends to increase income inequality the more wealth is 
stored in financial assets rather than deposits. Redistributive fiscal policy can mitigate or offset the 
impact on net income, however. Casiraghi et al. (2016) use the Banca d’Italia quarterly model of 
the Italian economy (BIQM) to simulate monetary policy impulses on a micro dataset of Italian 
households’ income and wealth. They find that the recent unconventional monetary policy 
measures of the ECB have produced a negligible effect on inequality in Italy. Finally, Ampudia et 
al. (2018) assess the impact of standard and non-standard monetary policy on inequality in the EA 
based on household survey data and find expansionary monetary policy to reduce income 
inequality. Expansionary policy hurts households with significant liquid assets by reducing their 
income from wealth. More importantly still, expansionary monetary policy raises labor income, 
which has benefitted in particular households without significant wealth. The increase in labor 
income of hand-to-mouth households has also reduced consumption inequality in the EA. This has 
occurred despite the observation by Dolado et al. (2018), based on US data, that expansionary 
monetary policy may raise income inequality among workers by increasing the wage premium for 
highly skilled. 
A part of the empirical studies mentioned above takes a partial equilibrium view, notably 
regressions of inequality metrics on monetary policy indicators that control for factors that may 
depend on monetary policy in the shorter or longer term as well. Accounting for interactions 
between different parts of the economy in establishing the net effects of policy over different time 
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horizons is the strength of structural dynamic macroeconomic models. Gornemann et al. (2016), 
e.g., analyze distributional consequences of conventional monetary policy in a New Keynesian 
model with household heterogeneity in time preferences and skills. Monetary policy with a strong 
focus on employment stabilization helps "ordinary" households, but hurts asset owners by reducing 
economy-wide savings and asset prices in their model. 
Despite the advantage of capturing interactions and second-round effects, analysis of the 
distributional impact of monetary policy in structural dynamic macroeconomic models has only 
emerged in recent years. The early New Keynesian DSGE models built on the assumption of a 
representative household, which precluded income or wealth inequality in the household sector. 
Subsequent work has introduced forms of heterogeneity, notably along the dimensions of wealth 
endowment and access to financial markets to better match business cycle facts. Liquidity-
constrained consumers (e.g., Galí et al. 2007) and credit-constrained households (e.g., Iacoviello 
2005) are prominent examples. More recently, HANK models (e.g., Kaplan et al. 2018) have 
introduced richer income and wealth distributions. At present, the richer distribution comes with 
constraints on the complexity in other dimensions and on the possibility to estimate the model, 
however.  
In light of the trade-off between a richer income and wealth distribution (HANK models), on the 
one hand, and additional complexity in other dimensions (notably the distinction between bonds of 
short versus long maturity in the modelling of QE, and the open-economy structure to include an 
exchange-rate channel of monetary policy) as well as model estimation, on the other hand, we 
restrict our analysis to a two-agent set-up with intertemporally optimizing asset owners (NLC) and 
hand-to-mouth (LC) households. Hence, our framework is a TANK model in the language of 
Debortoli and Galí (2018). To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the first to focus on relative 
income and wealth effects of QE in an estimated DSGE framework.  
 
3. Model environment 
Our analysis is undertaken in the two-region (EA and RoW) model of Hohberger et al. (2018), 
which introduces elements to study the effects of QE using the portfolio rebalancing approach. We 
motivate non-neutrality of QE through the imperfect substitutability between long-term and short-
term government bonds as in e.g., Andrés et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2012), Harrison (2012), and 
Priftis and Vogel (2016). 
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The EA region in the model is a one-sector economy. Perfectly competitive firms produce the final 
good, combining domestic and foreign intermediate goods and (imported) energy inputs. Firms in 
the intermediate goods sector are monopolistically competitive and maximize the present value of 
dividends (at a discount factor larger than the risk-free rate). There are two types of households: 
NLC households, who hold financial assets (equity and bonds), and LC households, who have no 
financial wealth and live ‘hand-to-mouth’. Given the holding of corporate equity (generating 
dividends) and domestic and foreign bonds (generating interest income), NLC households are 
significantly income-richer than LC ones in the steady state of our model. NLC households use 
financial markets to insure against income volatility, while LC households cannot insure and 
therefore benefit more strongly from a stabilization of economic activity and wage income. Wages 
of households are set by monopolistic trade unions. The government levies taxes on consumption, 
labor, profits, and a lump-sum tax, and issues debt to finance expenditures on consumption, 
investment, and transfers. The model features a number of nominal and real frictions (prices, 
wages, labor and capital adjustment), which are important to match business cycle properties.  
In view of the limitation to focusing on NLC versus LC households, our model lends itself to an 
analysis of income inequality based on labor income and asset returns (as well as redistribution 
through fiscal policy) rather than an assessment of wealth inequality. Regarding the latter, any 
increase (decline) in value of the NLC asset position implies an increase (decline) in wealth 
inequality, given that LC households have zero financial wealth.  
In what follows, we outline the elements of the model that are specific to the investigation of the 
distributional effects of conventional monetary policy and QE.1  
 
3.1 Distributional effects of monetary policy 
The literature has discussed a number of channels through which monetary policy may affect 
inequality.2 Our model captures the following elements: The income composition channel is present 
insofar as the two types of households have distinct income sources, and income from these sources 
varies in response to monetary policy. The portfolio channel is present, as expansionary monetary 
policy tends to increase the value of bonds and equity held by asset owners. The model also 
includes the counteracting effect that higher inflation in response to expansionary policy lowers 
                                                 
1 The outline neglects shocks and adjustment costs that are not crucial for the description. For a detailed overview of 
the model see Hohberger et al. (2018). 
2 For a discussion of the main distributional channels of monetary policy see Coibion et al. (2017). 
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the real value of nominal wealth. There are elements of the savings redistribution channel.3 
Notably, exchange rate adjustment affects the real value of the net foreign asset position and the 
associated interest payments; inflation affects the real value of government debt, where interest 
income goes to asset owners, whereas tax liabilities affect all households. The model also features 
a form of the financial segmentation channel in that the LC households do not have access to 
financial markets.4 Notably, our model does not capture an earnings heterogeneity channel (e.g., 
through sectoral or skill differentiation) as wage and employment levels are the same for the two 
groups of households. 
 
3.2 NLC households 
The estimated value for the share of NLC households in our model (0.82) is in line with survey 
evidence in Ampudia et al. (2018) that 77% of EA households have significant liquid assets, and 
can hence reallocate portfolios. Kaplan et al. (2014) report quantitatively similar population shares 
for the remainder of LC households for a number of Western countries, namely approximately 20% 
for the US, approximately 20% or less for Australia, France, Italy, and Spain, and approximately 
30% for Canada, the U.K., and Germany. 
NLC households’ preferences are given by the infinite horizon expected life-time utility: 
𝑈 = 𝐸0∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑢𝑡(. )
∞
𝑡=0         (1) 
with 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽exp⁡(𝜀𝑡−1
𝐶 ), where 𝛽 is the (non-stochastic) discount factor and 𝜀𝑡
𝐶 captures a shock to 
the subjective rate of time preference (saving shock). They enjoy utility from consumption, 𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶, 
and incur disutility from labor, 𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶. The instantaneous utility function of NLC households is 
defined as: 
𝑢(𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶 , 𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶) =
1
1−𝜃
(𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1
𝑁𝐿𝐶)1−𝜃 −
𝜔𝑁
1+𝜃𝑁
(𝐶𝑡)
1−𝜃(𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶)1+𝜃
𝑁
            (2) 
where ℎ ∈ (0; 1) measures the strength of external habits in consumption, and 𝜔𝑁 is the weight of 
the disutility of labor.  
The real period t budget constraint of NLC households, expressed relative to GDP deflator 𝑃𝑡, is: 
                                                 
3 As there is no direct borrower-lender relationship between hand-to-mouth households and asset holders, there is no 
direct redistribution between domestic private debtors and lenders, which is otherwise a key element of the savings 
redistribution channel (Doepke and Schneider, 2006). 
4 Williamson (2009) discusses a stricter form of the financial segmentation channel distinguishing between different 
classes of financial investors.   
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(1+𝜏𝐶)𝑃𝑡
𝐶
𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶 +
𝐵𝑡
𝑆
𝜔(1+𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑡
+
𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻
𝜔𝑃𝑡
(1 +
𝛾𝑏
2
(𝜅
𝐵𝑡
𝑆
𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻 − 1)
2
) +
𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑡
𝑊
𝜔(1+𝑖𝑡
𝑊)𝑃𝑡
+
𝛾𝑓
2
(
𝑒𝑡(𝐵𝑡
𝑊−?̅?𝑊)
𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡
)
2
+
𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝜔𝑃𝑡
+
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶
𝑃𝑡
= (1 − 𝜏𝑁)
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶 +
𝐵𝑡−1
𝑆
𝜔𝑃𝑡
+
𝑐+𝛿𝑏𝑃𝑡
𝑁
𝜔𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡−1
𝐿,𝐻 +
𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑡−1
𝑊
𝜔𝑃𝑡
+ (
𝑃𝑡
𝑆+𝑑𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝜔𝑃𝑡
)
𝑆𝑡−1
𝜔
+
𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶
𝑃𝑡
  
 (3) 
NLC households consume, 𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶, invest in short-term, 𝐵𝑡
𝑆, and long-term government bonds, 𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻
, 
foreign bonds, 𝐵𝑡
𝑊, corporate shares, 𝑆𝑡, and pay taxes on consumption, labor income, and in a 
lump-sum way (𝜏𝐶 , 𝜏𝑁 and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶), repsectively.5 They receive labor income, 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶, coupon 
payments on the long-term bonds, 𝑐 (defined below), dividends on corporate shares, 𝑑𝑡, and interest 
income on short-term bonds, 𝑖𝑡, and foreign bonds, 𝑖𝑡
𝑊, which are the differences between the 
notional value and the price at issuance. 𝑒𝑡𝐵𝑡
𝑊/(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑊) is the price in domestic currency of a 
foreign bond, where 𝑒𝑡 is the nominal exchange rate as the value in domestic currency of one unit 
of foreign currency. NLC households face an adjustment cost of holding foreign bonds, 𝛾𝑓, which 
captures a debt-dependent risk premium on foreign assets to ensure long-run stability (see Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2003). 𝑃𝑡
𝐶  is the price of the consumption good. The dividends paid by 
intermediate good firms to shareholders are 𝑑𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏
𝐾) (𝑌𝑡 −
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑡) + 𝜏
𝐾𝛿𝑘
𝑃𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑡
𝐾𝑡−1 −
𝑃𝑡
𝐼
𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑡 −
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑡
𝑘, which is after-tax (𝜏𝐾) corporate profit, i.e. turnover minus wage costs plus the capital 
depreciation allowance, net of investment expenditure (𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝑡) and capital-stock adjustment costs 
(𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑡
𝑘). The gross nominal return on equity (1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑆) can be defined as the combination of dividend 
payments and the change in share value, i.e. 1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑆 = (𝑃𝑡
𝑆 + 𝑑𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑌)/𝑃𝑡−1
𝑆 . 
 
3.3 Imperfect substitutability between short-term and long-term bonds 
The total outstanding government debt consists of long-term bonds, 𝐵𝑡
𝐿, held by the private sector, 
𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻
, and the central bank, 𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐶𝐵
, and short-term bonds, 𝐵𝑡
𝑆. The price in period t of a short-term 
(1-period) bond of nominal value, 𝐵𝑡
𝑆, is 𝐵𝑡
𝑆/(1 + 𝑖𝑡), with 𝑖𝑡 being the short-term nominal interest 
rate. Long-term government debt is modelled as in Woodford (2001) as perpetuity that pays a 
nominal coupon, 𝑐, which depreciates every period at the rate 𝛿𝑏. The price in period t of a long-
term bond, 𝑃𝑡
𝑁, issued in t equals the discounted value of future payments, 𝑃𝑡
𝑁 = ∑
𝛿𝑏
𝑛
(1+𝑖)1+𝑛
𝑐𝑇𝑛=0 , 
                                                 
5 We divide the value of financial assets by the population share of NLC households, ω, to transform economy-wide 
per-capita values into values per NLC household member.      
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where T is the maturity period of the bond. Short-term and long-term bonds are imperfect 
substitutes. In particular, NLC households target a mix of short-term and long-term bonds. 
Deviations from the target, 𝜅, for the ratio of long-term to short-term debt induce quadratic 
adjustment costs, 𝛾𝑏. 
 
3.4 Portfolio rebalancing 
NLC households maximize the present value of the expected stream of future utility subject to their 
budget constraint, by choosing the amount of consumption, 𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶, and next period asset holdings, 
𝐵𝑡
𝑆, 𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻, 𝑆𝑡, 𝐵𝑡
𝑊. Combining the first-order conditions (FOCs) with respect to 𝐵𝑡
𝑆 with 𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶, 𝑆𝑡, 
and 𝐵𝑡
𝑊, illustrates the transmission channels of monetary policy to the real economy in the model: 
1
1+𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑏𝜅𝑃𝑡
𝑁 (𝜅
𝐵𝑡
𝑆
𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻 − 1) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡 (
(1+𝜏𝐶)𝑃𝑡+1
𝐶
(1+𝜏𝐶)𝑃𝑡
𝐶
𝑢′(𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶)
𝑢′(𝐶𝑡+1
𝑁𝐿𝐶)
)    (4) 
1
1+𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑏𝜅𝑃𝑡
𝑁 (𝜅
𝐵𝑡
𝑆
𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻 − 1) = 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑃𝑡
𝑆
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑆 +𝑑𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
)    (5) 
1
1+𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑏𝜅𝑃𝑡
𝑁 (𝜅
𝐵𝑡
𝑆
𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻 − 1) = 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡+1
(
1
1+𝑖𝑡
𝑊 + 𝛾𝑓𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑡
𝑊−?̅?𝑊
𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡
))   (6) 
The effects of a conventional monetary policy shock work in a standard fashion through the direct 
impact that the change in the short-term interest rate has on macroeconomic variables. An 
expansionary monetary policy shock leads to a reduction in savings (eq. 4), an increase in the prices 
of corporate equity (eq. 5), and an increase in the demand for foreign-currency denominated bonds, 
which leads to depreciation of the domestic currency (eq. 6). 
The impact of QE on asset prices derives from the NLC households’ portfolio adjustment costs. If 
𝛾𝑏 > 0, the effects of falling 𝐵𝑡
𝐿,𝐻
 relative to 𝐵𝑡
𝑆 in the household portfolio, as the central bank 
purchases long-term bonds, are similar to the impact of a reduction of the short-term interest rate, 
𝑖𝑡. Hence, QE can mimic the effects of a lower short-term interest rate on aggregate variables. 
When the central bank purchases long-term bonds, NLC households, aiming to re-establish the 
portfolio mix of short-term and long-term bonds, can respond by investing in equity and foreign 
bonds, and by reducing savings. For given levels of the short-term rate, QE reduces private saving 
(eq. 4), triggers portfolio reallocation from government bonds towards corporate equity (eq. 5), and 
leads to higher demand for foreign assets, which depreciates the domestic currency (eq. 6). 
Concerning the transmission to the real economy, (i) lower savings imply a substitution away from 
future consumption and towards contemporaneous consumption demand, (ii) rising stock markets 
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lead to stronger investment and capital accumulation, and (iii) exchange rate depreciation 
strengthens net exports if export demand and import demand are sufficiently price elastic. 
 
3.5 Other channels of quantitative easing 
The impact of conventional expansionary monetary policy and QE on portfolio allocation in the 
model has implications for consumption and investment that are similar to those of an extension of 
credit. First, financial intermediaries may face a similar decision problem as NLC households in 
our set-up. When the central bank buys long-term government bonds from banks, the latter can 
respond by buying more equity and foreign assets, and by providing more loans to firms.  
Second, expansionary monetary policy can raise the net worth of banks and extend their lending 
margin in the presence of capital-requirement or equivalent constraints, as in, e.g., Gertler and 
Karadi (2011). Notably, Ricci (2015) finds that banks are more sensitive to non-standard measures 
than to interest rate decisions.  
Moreover, financial investors in our model can also be interpreted to include pension and 
investment funds that act on behalf of households. Boubaker et al. (2018) provides evidence for 
portfolio rebalancing among institutional investors in form of a substantial increase in pension 
funds’ allocation to equity assets during the US Fed’s unconventional monetary policy measures. 
Our framework abstracts from the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. The risk-taking channel 
argues that investment strategies of financial investors may involve a “search for yield” through a 
demand for risky, tail-risk sensitive and illiquid securities (Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2012) in a 
low interest rate environment (either through conventional policy or QE). The risk-taking channel 
of monetary policy has been shown to exist both in the US and in the EA. For the US, Bekaert et 
al. (2013) find a causal relationship between lax (conventional) monetary policy and increased risk 
appetite in financial markets. In addition, lower interest rates have been shown to result in reduced 
lending standards (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011), higher leverage (de 
Groot, 2014) as well as increased asset risks (Angeloni et al., 2015). For the EA, expansionary 
monetary policy is associated with an increase in the willingness of banks to accept risk (Altunbas 
et al., 2014; Jimenez et al., 2014) and with lower lending standards (Neuenkirch and Noeckel, 
2018). 
The risk-taking channel constitutes an additional transmission mechanism for monetary policy, but 
its distributional implications for financial investors versus hand-to-mouth households are not 
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obvious. While "search for yield" may imply higher asset returns and valuation effects, potentially 
beneficial effects on corporate investment, output and employment would also benefit non-investor 
households through the labor income channel. Regarding distributional effects, the risk-taking 
channel may, hence, be similar to the portfolio rebalancing channel (combined with increased risk 
appetite) which we focus on in this paper. 
Finally, an additional channel is that of investor sentiment (Lutz, 2015), i.e. that expansionary 
monetary policy leads to increased investor confidence/sentiment. This channel is partially 
captured in our model as far as expansionary monetary policy is likely to improve the economic 
outlook, which in turn affects investment decisions by forward-looking agents. 
 
3.6 Conventional monetary policy and QE 
Conventional monetary policy, as the first case, is described by a Taylor rule, where the central 
bank sets the short-term policy rate 𝑖𝑡 in response to inflation and the output gap. The policy rate 
reacts sluggishly to deviations of inflation from its respective target level and to the output gap, 
and it is subject to random shocks: 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖̅ = 𝜌
𝑖(𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑖)̅ + (1 − 𝜌
𝑖) (𝜂𝑖𝜋(0.25(∑ 𝜋𝑡−𝑟
𝑐3
𝑟=0 ) − ?̅?
𝑐) + 𝜂𝑖𝑦(?̃?𝑡)) ⁡+⁡𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚  (7) 
where 𝑖̅ = 𝑟 + 𝜋𝑐 is the steady-state nominal interest rate, equal to the sum of the steady-state real 
interest rate and steady-state CPI inflation. ?̃?𝑡 ≡ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡) − ?̅?𝑡 is the output gap with ?̅?𝑡 as (log) 
potential output. It is assumed that the risk-free rate is equal to the policy rate. A monetary policy 
shock in the conventional setting is therefore a shock to the exogenous component of the Taylor 
rule, 𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚.  
QE, as the second case, implies an increase in the central bank’s holding of longer-maturity assets. 
In the context of the European public-sector purchase program (PSPP), which accounts for most 
of the ECB’s QE measures since 2015, the central bank purchases long-term government bonds 
( 
,L CB
tB ) and provides additional liquidity to the private sector. The operating profit of the central 
bank equals the sum of base money issuance and interest income minus the current expenditure on 
buying long-term bonds, where the latter equals the change of the value of long-term bonds on the 
central bank’s balance sheet: 
, , ,
1 1( )
CB L CB N L CB N L CB
t t t t t b t tPR M cB P B P B          (8) 
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We focus on the situation where the central bank engages in QE under an (endogenously) binding 
ZLB constraint. A binding ZLB implies that the target (‘shadow’) short-term policy rate is below 
the lower bound. An increase in output and inflation achieved by QE or other factors does not lead 
to tightening of the short-term rate as long as the ZLB is binding. As in Hohberger et al. (2018), 
we treat the occasionally binding ZLB via a piecewise linear solution. We employ the OccBin 
method developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) and complement it with an algorithm by 
Giovannini and Ratto (2018) to obtain smoothed estimates of latent variables as well as the 
sequence of binding regimes along the historical sample.  
In the case of conventional monetary policy, the endogenous part of the unconstrained nominal 
short-term interest rate 𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝐶 follows the Taylor rule in equation (7) without monetary shock 𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚. 
As long as the actual policy rate (𝑖𝑡) is above the lower bound, it can be expressed as: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝐶 +⁡𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚 
If 𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝐶 ≤ 𝑖𝐿𝐵 = 0, the policy rate is constrained: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖
𝐿𝐵 +⁡𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚 
The variable 𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝐶 acts as the ‘shadow’ interest rate under a constrained regime. The algorithm by 
Giovannini and Ratto (2018) allows determining endogenously the duration of an occasionally 
binding constraint (see Hohberger et al., 2018). 
 
3.7 Measuring the distributional impact of monetary policy 
In order to assess the distributional impact of monetary policy we construct measures of household 
income and wealth positions and trace the responses of these statistics to standard monetary policy 
and quantitative easing shocks. 
Net disposable income of LC households: Net disposable income of the ‘hand-to-mouth’ 
households is the sum of net wage income and transfer income minus lump-sum taxes: 
(1 − 𝜏𝑁)𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝐿𝐶 + 𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝐶 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡
𝐿𝐶      (9) 
Net disposable income of NLC households: Net disposable income of the asset owners is the sum 
of net wage income, interest income from short-term government bonds, coupon payments on long-
term government bonds, interest income on the foreign-currency denominated bond, dividend 
income on equity, and transfer income minus lump-sum taxes: 
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(1 − 𝜏𝑁)𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝐿𝐶 +
𝑖𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑡
𝑆
𝜔
+ 𝑐
𝐵𝑡−1
𝐿,𝐻
𝜔
+
𝑖𝑡
𝑊
1+𝑖𝑡
𝑊 𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑡
𝑊
𝜔
+ 𝑑𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑌 𝑆𝑡−1
𝜔
+ 𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡
𝑁𝐿𝐶  (10) 
Net asset position of NLC households: The net asset position of asset holders at the beginning of 
period t equals the value of holdings of short-term and long-term government bonds, net foreign-
currency denominated bonds, corporate equity, and money: 
𝐵𝑡−1
𝑆
𝜔
+ 𝛿𝑏𝑃𝑡
𝑁 𝐵𝑡−1
𝐿,𝐻
𝜔
+ 𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑡−1
𝑊
𝜔
+ 𝑃𝑡
𝑆 𝑆𝑡−1
𝜔
+
𝑀𝑡−1
𝜔
     (11) 
When discussing income inequality (Section 4), we will emphasize the response of LC (NLC) 
disposable income relative to average disposable income in the economy. In the context of our two-
household model, the relative per-capita income is a simpler metric than, e.g., the Gini coefficient, 
which measures the concentration of income or wealth along a continuum of heterogeneous 
households. Concerning the wealth distribution, as already mentioned, any increase (decline) in the 
value of the NLC household asset portfolio constitutes an increase (decline) in wealth inequality 
in our model, given that LC households have zero financial wealth.  
 
4. Econometric approach and model solution 
We compute an approximate model solution by linearizing the model around its deterministic 
steady state. We calibrate a subset of parameters to match long-run data properties and estimate 
the remaining parameters using Bayesian methods. The observables employed in estimation are 
listed in the Data Appendix. The estimation uses quarterly data for the period 1999q1-2017q1. We 
also perform estimation on the subsample 1999q1-2014q4 to test the stability of parameter 
estimates, especially the adjustment cost (portfolio preference) parameter γb, with respect to the 
implementation of QE. The model has been estimated using the slice sampler algorithm proposed 
by Neal (2003).  
We calibrate the steady state of the model so that steady-state ratios of main economic aggregates 
(relative to GDP) match average historical ratios over the sample period (see Table B.1 in the 
Appendix). The EA steady-state ratios of private consumption and investment to GDP are set to 
56% and 18%, respectively. The steady-state share of EA GDP in world GDP is 16%. The steady-
state trade share (0.5*(exports+imports)/GDP) is set at 19% in the EA (excluding intra-EA trade), 
and the quarterly depreciation rate of capital is 1.4%. We set the steady-state government debt to 
74% of annual GDP in the EA. The steady-state real GDP growth and inflation rates are set to 
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0.35% and 0.4% per quarter, respectively, and the effective rate of time preferences to 0.25% per 
quarter. 
With respect to the QE model extension, we observe the ‘securities held for monetary policy 
purposes’ as proxy for long-term bond holdings by the ECB, the share of long-term debt in total 
government debt, and the current and 3-month-ahead swap rates on 10-year government bonds to 
calculate the implied expected period-on-period return on long-term bonds.6 We set the steady-
state portfolio share of long-term to short-term government debt (κ) to 0.916 in line with the 
average of outstanding EA government debt over the sample period. Since we use interest rates for 
bonds with residual maturity of 10 years in our quarterly model, the corresponding depreciation 
rate of long-term government debt (δb) is 0.975.  
It is crucial to identify the parameter on portfolio adjustment costs (γb) accurately as this parameter 
determines the impact of QE on the spread between short-term and long-term bond yields in the 
model. We specify a prior distribution with a mean of 15/10000 and a standard deviation of 
6/10000.7 This captures the range of changes in interest spreads between short and long-term bonds 
around the time of the ECB’s QE announcement. 
We treat ECB QE as an AR(2) shock for which the estimated parameters provide a hump-shaped 
path of central bank holdings of long-term government debt. The AR(2) specification captures the 
expectation of a further expansion of the central bank balance sheet in the future, as announced by 
the ECB at the start of its PSPP.  
For QE under the ZLB constraint, we calculate impulse response functions (IRFs) using the 
concept of generalized impulse response functions: We choose as starting point 2015q1, which is 
a period of constrained monetary policy according to the Giovannini and Ratto (2018) algorithm, 
and the official start of the PSPP. We shut off the QE shock and simulate the model with all 
remaining shocks. Then we perform simulations adding a QE shock equivalent to long-term bond 
purchases of 1% of steady-state quarterly EA GDP on impact. The difference between the two 
simulations provides the IRF of the QE shock under an occasionally binding constraint. The size 
of the simulated QE shock is illustratively calibrated and does not reflect the actual purchases of 
long-term bonds by the ECB. 
                                                 
6 This approach is consistent with our modelling assumption that agents are not obliged to hold long-term bonds to 
maturity, but can trade these bonds in the secondary market at each period in time instead. 
7 We check the robustness of this prior by specifying an uninformative uniform distribution for γb. In both cases the 
posterior estimate is well identified around 0.0007. 
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In order to render the aggregate effects of the conventional monetary policy shock comparable to 
those of the QE shock, we adjust the monetary policy rule to generate GDP effects that are 
comparable in magnitude and dynamics to the QE shock. Since the monetary policy shock is being 
estimated as a white noise shock, we harmonize the persistence of the policy paths by setting the 
interest rate smoothing parameter (𝜌𝑖) to 0.95, which quantitatively mimics the short-run effects of 
the QE shock on GDP under a ZLB regime. 
The posterior estimates of key model parameters for the EA are reported in Table B.2 in the 
Appendix. The posterior estimates are based on the linearized version of the model (without ZLB); 
they are also used for the solution with an occasionally binding constraint. 
 
5. Distributional effects of monetary policy shocks 
Figure 1 shows responses of EA macro aggregates and relative income and wealth to a standard 
monetary policy and a QE shock. Figure 2 provides a decomposition of the components of NLC 
household income as described in Section 2.7.8  
 
5.1 Conventional monetary policy 
Following an expansionary conventional monetary policy shock, real GDP and inflation increase 
temporarily. The domestic currency depreciates in nominal terms, and the economy depreciates 
against the RoW also in real effective terms. Real wages and hours worked increase in response to 
growing demand for labor. The short-term real interest rate declines, which stimulates domestic 
demand. LC and NLC consumption increase, but the increase is more pronounced for LC 
households. This resonates with previous findings in the literature that more financially constrained 
households have a higher marginal propensity to consume (Baker and Yannelis, 2017; Blundell et 
al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Zeldes, 1989).  
The wage share declines on impact due to the only moderate increase in real wages and the delayed 
response of hours worked. The delay in wage adjustment is driven by the estimated strong real-
wage inertia and leads initially to an increase in the profit share. The net income share of LC 
households relative to GDP declines initially with the decline in the wage share. The response of 
the LC income share turns positive in the medium term. In contrast, the response of the net income 
                                                 
8 Across all Figures we do not report error bands accounting for estimation uncertainty, but note that all impulse 
response functions are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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share of NLC households does not turn positive after the initial decline, but reverts to baseline in 
the medium term.  
The fact that both LC and NLC household disposable income relative to GDP decline in Figure 2 
relates to the role of fiscal policy. While NLC households suffer from a decline in the wage share 
and benefit from a higher profit share (dividend payments) on impact, they are, in addition, exposed 
to falling interest income on short-term bonds and a declining share of government transfers in 
income (automatic stabilizers). The mirror image of falling household income to GDP is due to an 
increase in the government budget balance in the model. 
Figure 1: Impulse responses for expansionary short-term rate and QE shock 
 
Note: Time intervals on the x-axis are quarters; units on the y-axis are in per cent, except for inflation, interest rates, 
the wage share, income shares and the asset position (pp). The wage share, the income shares and the net asset position 
are expressed relative to quarterly nominal GDP. 
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Figure 2: Decomposition of NLC net income into components 
 
Note: Time intervals on the x-axis are quarters. The income shares are expressed relative to quarterly nominal GDP 
and displayed in percentage-point deviations from the baseline. 
 
5.2 Quantitative easing 
The purchase of long-term government debt by the central bank reduces the amount of long-term 
debt held by NLC households. In light of the preference of NLC households for a maturity mix, 
the price of long-term bonds rises, and the expected return on long-term bonds consequently falls. 
The decline in the expected return on long-term bonds leads to portfolio rebalancing towards 
corporate equity and foreign assets, leading to higher investment and real effective depreciation of 
the domestic currency. The lower expected return on long-term bonds also reduces private savings, 
which leads to an increase in NLC consumption. Stronger domestic demand increases the demand 
for labor, which strengthens LC wage income and consumption. Stronger domestic demand and 
net exports imply an increase in real GDP and higher (demand-driven) inflation. 
Figure 1 shows an initial fall in the wage share to GDP also for the QE shock. The wage share 
response turns positive in the medium term, however, as employment and real wages increase. The 
net income share of LC households declines on impact, but improves in the medium term in line 
with the wage share. The NLC net income share faces a persistent decline, which is driven primarily 
by lower income (coupon payments) on long-term bond holdings, as part of the stock is purchased 
by the central bank in return for interest-free money. The return on short-term bonds remains 
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unchanged in the short run due to the ZLB constraint, but increases in the medium term as the 
(shadow) interest rate endogenously exits the constraint and becomes positive.  
 
5.3 Income and wealth inequality 
A metric to assess the impact of shocks on income inequality more directly is the per-capita 
disposable income of LC and NLC households relative to the average per-capita disposable income 
in the economy. Figure 3 shows the responses of the relative LC (NLC) net disposable income, i.e. 
LC (NLC) per-capita disposable income relative to the population average, for the conventional 
monetary policy and QE shocks in Figures 1 and 2. Both shocks have qualitatively identical effects. 
The LC disposable income in relative terms slightly declines on impact, but then increases quickly 
to above baseline and persistently remains above baseline in the medium and longer run. The NLC 
net income in relative terms increases slightly on impact, but then falls below baseline and 
persistently remains below baseline in the medium and longer run.9 
Figure 3: Dynamic of disposable household income relative to the economy-wide average 
 
Note: Time intervals on the x-axis are quarters. The income shares measure the respective household (LC vs NLC) 
disposable income (after taxes and transfers) relative to the economy-wide average household disposable income and 
are expressed in percentage-point deviations from the baseline. 
 
The relative income responses are driven by the response of wage income versus income on 
financial assets. Higher employment and real wages in response to expansionary monetary policy 
lead to higher labor income. Higher labor income benefits especially the LC households, given that 
                                                 
9 Changes in LC and NLC income relative to the average household income in the economy move, by definition, in 
opposite direction. The LC versus NLC percentage-point changes differ, however. NLC households represent a larger 
share of the population according to our estimates. A given absolute change in income therefore implies a more 
pronounced change in average LC household income compared to average NLC household income. LC and NLC 
income effects add up to zero when adjusted for LC and NLC population shares.           
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wages are their only source of primary revenue. NLC households also receive higher wage income, 
but at the same time see the contribution of dividend payments and income on financial investment 
decline in relative terms (Figure 2). In the case of the conventional monetary policy shock, interest 
income from holding short-term government bonds declines. In the case of the QE shock, NLC 
households face a decline in their long-term bond position, which implies a loss in income from 
coupon payments. For monetary policy shocks with similar initial impact on aggregate GDP, the 
loss of coupon payments (QE) is quantitatively more important than the decline in interest received 
on short-term bonds (conventional policy shock), which explains the larger changes in the LC 
versus NLC income shares in the case of QE. For a QE shock that generates around 0.1% initial 
increase in real GDP, a change in relative per-capita income by more than 0.1 percentage points 
for LC households is not negligible in quantitative terms. The relative income effect for a 
comparable expansionary shock to the short-term rate (Taylor rule) is much smaller instead.  
The relative income responses for LC and NLC households are in line with the finding in Ampudia 
et al. (2018) for the EA that expansionary monetary policy reduces household income inequality 
and that positive employment and wage responses are an important driver of this result. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Given our two-household model set-up with NLC asset-owner versus zero-asset LC households, 
any increase (decline) in the NLC portfolio value corresponds to increasing (declining) wealth 
inequality. The expansionary monetary policy shocks raise the value of financial assets on impact, 
so that the net asset position of NLC households increases in terms of domestic GDP. The valuation 
effect in response to the conventional monetary policy shock remains temporary and recedes as the 
monetary shock decays. The effect is not negligible in quantitative terms, however.  
The short-term response of NLC wealth to the QE shock is quantitatively very similar to the 
response to conventional monetary policy shocks. Instead of returning to baseline however, the net 
wealth of NLC households falls below baseline in the medium and long term in response to the QE 
shock. The negative wealth effect derives from the loss of coupon payments, which is a 
consequence of the NLC households’ reduced holding of long-term bonds. The persistent fall in 
bond returns (coupon payments) leads to a decumulation of NLC assets compared to baseline in 
the medium and longer term. Overall, the impulse responses suggest that temporary expansionary 
conventional monetary policy and QE shocks may reinforce wealth inequality temporarily on 
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impact, without implying persistent increases in wealth inequality between asset owners and 
households without (liquid) assets. 
 
5.5 Actual volumes of quantitative easing 
Since the model does not lead to transition to a new steady state for real variables in response to 
temporary monetary policy shocks, changes in income shares and inequality are temporary and 
decay in the long term. To illustrate the impact of QE volumes of the magnitude of the ECB 
program over the medium term, we conduct a deterministic experiment where we replicate the path 
of bond purchases by the central bank in the context of the PSPP.  
Figure 4 illustrates the implied path of the QE policy considered. The deterministic shock lasts for 
three years. It has a hump-shaped pattern due to the AR(2) specification and a cumulative size of 
around 50% of annual EA GDP. While the expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet stops after 
four years, it remains extended for a long time, given the persistence in the shock profile. 
Figure 4: Simulated path of QE program 
 
Note: Time intervals on the x-axis are years; units on the y-axis 
are per cent of GDP. 
 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the policy path on a selection of endogenous model variables. Given 
the deterministic setting, shock duration and size are known ex ante, i.e. anticipated by the private 
sector.  
The effect on GDP is large and reflects the large volume of the QE program as well as its 
deterministic nature in the scenario. Since the assumption of perfect foresight implies front-loading 
of the QE effects, real GDP and consumer prices increase by 2% and 1.2% on impact, respectively. 
The effects of the implied QE path are persistent, with real GDP being 0.3% and consumer prices 
6% above baseline after 10 years.  
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The impact on LC income as share of GDP is positive in the medium run, in line with the medium-
term increase in the wage share, and reaches a size of 0.3% of nominal GDP compared to baseline 
after 10 years. NLC income to GDP falls, reaching a level of -1.2 percentage points below baseline 
after 10 years. The asset position of NLC households increases by 20% of nominal GDP on impact, 
but falls thereafter to less than 20 percentage points below baseline after 10 years. Both LC and 
NLC consumption increase in line with higher income. LC consumption rises more in per-cent 
terms, in line with the increasing LC income-to-GDP share. 
Figure 5: Impact of the deterministic QE path 
 
Note: Time intervals on the x-axis are years; units on the y-axis are in per cent (pp for inflation, interest rates, income 
shares and the asset position to GDP). Shares are expressed in per cent of annual nominal GDP. 
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6. Conclusion  
This paper analyzes the distributional consequences of conventional monetary policy and QE using 
an estimated open-economy DSGE model of the EA and the RoW, with NLC (asset owners) and 
LC (‘hand-to-mouth’) households. The model includes imperfect substitutability between 
government bonds of different maturities and central bank balance sheet operations, and it 
compares impulse response functions from shocks to the Taylor rule (conventional monetary 
policy) and the central bank balance sheet (QE).  
Overall, expansionary conventional monetary policy and QE shocks do not increase, but rather 
mitigate income and wealth inequality between population groups in our two-household model in 
the short (income) and medium (income and wealth) term. While the distinction between two 
household groups is certainly simplistic, it provides insight with respect to the functional income 
distribution and the dependence of income and wealth effects on income sources and financial 
market participation.  
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APPENDIX A: DATA  
 
1. Data sources 
Data for the EA (quarterly national accounts, fiscal aggregates, quarterly interest and exchange 
rates) are taken from Eurostat. ROW series are constructed on the basis of the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases.  
 
2. Constructing of data series for ROW variables 
Series for GDP and prices in the ROW starting in 1999 are constructed on the basis of data for the 
following 59 countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, 
Georgia, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, 
Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The ROW data are annual data 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
databases.  
 
3. List of observables 
The estimation uses the following time series for the EA: GDP, GDP deflator, population, total 
employment, employment rate, relative prices with respect to GDP deflator (VAT-consumption, 
government consumption, private investment, export, and import), government investment price 
relative to private investment, nominal policy rate, and nominal shares of GDP (consumption, 
government consumption, investment, government investment, government interest payment, 
transfers, public debt, wage bill and exports). The list of observables also includes the oil price and 
the effective exchange rate of the EA. For the ROW we use data on population, GDP, GDP deflator 
and the nominal policy rate. The EA specific QE observables are securities held for monetary 
policy purposes as proxy for long-term bond holdings by the ECB and the share of long-term debt 
in total government debt. Furthermore, we use current and 3-month-ahead swap rates on 10-year 
government bonds to calculate the implied expected period-on-period return on long-term bonds. 
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APPENDIX B: CALIBRATION AND POSTERIOR ESTIMATES 
 
Table B.1: Calibrated parameters and steady-state ratios 
Description Parameter or ratio Source 
Preferences   
Intertemporal discount factor 0.9975 annual discount rate of 1% 
Degree of openness 0.19 data 
Substitutability btw domestic varieties 6.97 endogenized in steady state 
Weight of disutility of labor 9.75 endogenized in steady state 
Production   
Cobb-Douglas labor share 0.65 standard share in literature 
Depreciation of private and public capital 0.0144 data 
Share of oil in total output 0.015 data 
Fiscal policy   
Consumption tax 0.20 data 
Corporate profit tax 0.30 data 
Labor tax 0.44 endogenized in steady state 
Deficit target 0.021 data 
Debt target 2.96 data 
Steady state ratios   
Private consumption share 0.56 data 
Private investment share 0.18 data 
Gov’t consumption share 0.20 data 
Gov’t investment share 0.03 data 
Transfers share 0.16 data 
Others   
Size of the country (% of world) 16.44 data 
Trend of total factor productivity 0.0033 data 
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Table B.2: Prior and posterior distributions of key estimated EA model parameters 
Description Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution 
 Dist. Mean (Std.) Mode (Std.) 
Preferences    
Consumption habit persistence B 0.5 (0.20) 0.90 (0.02) 
Risk aversion G 1.5 (0.20) 1.54 (0.17) 
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply G 2.5 (0.50) 2.09 (0.44) 
Import price elasticity G 2 (1) 2.54 (0.28) 
Steady state consumption share of NLC HH B 0.65 (0.10) 0.82 (0.04) 
Nominal and real frictions    
Portfolio adjustment costs G 0.0015 (0.0006) 0.0007 (0.0002) 
Price adjustment cost G 60 (40) 42.6 (9.25) 
Nominal wage adj. cost G 5 (2) 5.55 (1.48) 
Real wage rigidity B 0.5 (0.20) 0.97 (0.01) 
Monetary Policy    
Interest rate persistence B 0.7 (0.12) 0.80 (0.03) 
Response to inflation B 2 (0.4) 1.61 (0.19) 
Response to GDP B 0.5 (0.2) 0.06 (0.02) 
Autocorrelations of shocks    
QE AR(1) (purchases of long-term bonds) N 1.8 (0.4) 1.75 (0.10) 
QE AR(2) (purchases of long-term bonds) N -0.8 (0.3) -0.76 (0.09) 
Bond risk premium B 0.5 (0.20) 0.87 (0.05) 
Domestic price mark-up B 0.5 (0.20) 0.54 (0.13) 
Standard deviations (%) of innovations    
Monetary Policy B 1 (0.40) 0.10 (0.01) 
QE (purchases of long-term bonds) G 1 (0.40) 1.12 (0.17) 
Investment risk premium G 0.1 (0.40) 0.30 (0.05) 
Bond risk premium G 1 (0.40) 0.17 (0.09) 
Domestic price mark-up G 2 (0.80) 4.46 (1.07) 
Notes: Cols. (1) lists estimated model parameters and shocks. Cols. (2)-(3) indicates the prior distribution 
function (B: Beta distribution; G: Gamma distribution; N: Normal distribution). Cols. (4)-(5) show the mode 
and the standard deviation (std) of the posterior distributions of EA parameters. 
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